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A SIMULATION EVALUATION OF A HUMAN-CENTERED APPROACH TO FLIGHT DECK
PROCEDURES AND AUTOMATION FOR EN ROUTE FREE MANEUVERING
Walter W. Johnson and Vernol Battiste
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA
Stacie Granada, Nancy Johnson, and Arik Quang Dao
San Jose State University
Moffett Field, CA

Dominic Wong and Anthony Tang
QSS Group Inc.
Moffett Field, CA

A joint simulation was conducted by NASA Ames and Langley Research Centers. This paper presents flight deck
performance and subjective data collected at the NASA Ames Research Center. During the simulation of en route
free maneuvering, the presence and mixture of managed and autonomous aircraft was manipulated, as was the
number of autonomous aircraft.. These manipulations allowed for an examination of the viability of both conducting
mixed AFR-IFR operations, and of substantially increasing en route traffic through insertion of AFR aircraft. The
Ames airside performance and pilot comment data support the safety and feasibility of the concept, with double en
route capacity appearing to be easily achievable. This work was supported by NASA’s Advanced Air Transportation
Technologies (AATT) project.
Introduction
In June 2004, research teams at the NASA Ames and
Langley Research Centers conducted a joint human-inthe-loop simulation investigating the feasibility and
operational benefits of a free flight concept under
consideration by NASA’s Distributed Air Ground
Traffic Management (DAG-TM) effort. The goal of
DAG-TM is the expansion of airspace capacity and, to
this end, several concepts have been developed and
evaluated as part of this effort. The concept evaluated in
this simulation was called En Route Free Maneuvering.
The premise was that greater efficiency and capacity
could be gained through a redistribution of roles and
responsibilities, and attendant decision-making, to the
aircraft operators (e.g., flight crews) and the air traffic
management system (e.g., air traffic controllers). The
envisioned solution requires new human-centered
operational paradigms enabled by advances in decision
support tools: information sharing; communication,
navigation, and surveillance; air traffic management
technologies; and procedures supporting distributed
separation responsibilities.
Simulation Overview
The simulation investigated the feasibility of an en route
free maneuvering concept with respect to traffic
scalability and airspace mixture. The free maneuvering
concept assigned the en route autonomous aircraft two
tasks. First, autonomous aircraft had the task of
maintaining separation from other aircraft. Second,
autonomous aircraft arrivals were responsible for
arriving at a TRACON meter fix at a required time of
arrival. Scalability refers to the ability to increase the
density of en route aircraft by adding autonomous

aircraft, while airspace mixture refers to the mixing of
autonomous and managed aircraft in the same airspace.
Autonomous aircraft are aircraft flying according to
Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR) designed specifically
for free maneuvering aircraft, while managed aircraft
are aircraft flying according to standard Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) by which aircraft fly today. The
simulation was manned by a team of certified
professional controllers and commercial-rated pilots
who operated within a simulated airspace similar to the
northwest portion of the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic
Control Center (ZFW). Traffic scenarios were created to
simulate realistic traffic flow into and out of the DallasFt.Worth (DFW) airport, and also overflights through
the ZFW airspace. Varying traffic volume between
scenarios was accomplished by altering only the number
of overflights, and thus Scalability was manipulated
only for en route (non-arrival) flight. The arrival
problem, while demanding, remained relatively constant
throughout all scenarios, but was impacted by
the increased overflights passing near and around the
arrival stream.
The DAG-TM simulation environment was distributed
across two NASA facilities and several laboratories. At
the Ames Research Center, the Airspace Operations
Laboratory (AOL) provided aircraft target generation
and ran the human-in-the-loop air traffic control (ATC)
part of the simulation. The AOL utilized professional air
traffic controllers and also provided “pseudopilots,”
who were given specialized tools that allowed them to
simultaneously control multiple
background IFR
aircraft. The use of IFR pseudopilots was necessary
because the volume of traffic was such that it was
impossible to assign one person for every aircraft in
the airspace.
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AFR human-in-the-loop flight deck simulation and
evaluations were conducted at the NASA Ames Flight
Deck Display Research Laboratory and the NASA Air
Traffic Operations Laboratory. Both centers were
responsible for gathering data on professional pilots
serving as participants. Also, as with the AOL, these
laboratories provided pseudopilots to control
background AFR traffic.
The Ames and Langley AFR flight decks and
pseudopilot stations were different and flew in separate
areas of the airspace. Only the Ames AFR flight decks
are examined in this report.
The entire scope of the DAG-TM En Route Free
Maneuvering Simulation is far too large to describe in
the present conference report. Those interested in
greater detail are referred to the Joint NASA
Ames/Langley Joint Simulation Final Report (Raytheon
ATMSDI Team, 2004). The present report focuses
solely on selected aspects the NASA Ames Flight Deck
simulation evaluations.

NASA Ames Flight Deck Implementation
The NASA Ames flight deck implementation for the
DAG-TM En Route Free Maneuvering work is based on
the Airborne Management of En route Separation
Display (AMES Display). The AMES Display was
developed between 1995 and 2000 to support initial
examinations of Free Flight by NASA’s Advanced
Aeronautical Transportation Technologies Project
(Johnson, Battiste, Delzell, Holland, Belcher, & Jordan,
1997; Johnson, Battiste, & Holland, 1999). The AMES
Display was not only a display, but was an integrated
approach to the display, manipulation, and management
of flight path information required for free maneuvering
in the en route environment.
As such, a free
maneuvering concept was actually embedded in its
design,
although the present DAG-TM work
considerably surpasses this initial work in scope and
requirements. Nevertheless, important design decisions
made during the development of the AMES Display
continued to inform the DAG-TM work. Perhaps the
most important of these concerned the role of intent
information.

Roles and Responsibilities
The DAG En Route Free Maneuvering concept placed a
large number of new responsibilities on the AFR pilots,
responsibilities that have previously been reserved to air
traffic control. First, and foremost, the AFR pilots were
assigned the responsibility for maintaining separation
from all IFR (ATC managed) aircraft. In addition, they
were responsible for maintaining separation from other
AFR aircraft according to a set of “rules-of-the-road”
(c.f., Johnson, Canton, Battiste, & Johnson, 2005).
When responsible, or “burdened,” AFR pilots were
required to resolve any impending loss-of-separation
(LOS) prior to two minutes to the predicted time of the
LOS. In addition, when attempting to resolve a conflict,
AFR pilots were not allowed to create a predicted LOS
that was less than four minutes in the future. Some AFR
flights were solely overflights, but others flew arrivals.
These AFR arrivals were given the responsibility for
meeting a required-time-of-arrival (RTA) (+/- 15s) for
the DFW Meter Fix BAMBE. The arrivals began the
simulation during cruise ~200 NM from BAMBE, and
were assigned their RTA when they were approximately
160 nm (~20 min) from BAMBE. In addition to the
RTA restriction, AFR aircraft were required to cross
BAMBE at 11000 ft (+/- 300 ft) and 250 kts (+/- 10 kts).
If these crossing restrictions could not be met, then the
TRACON controller could refuse the AFR aircraft
permission to cross into the TRACON, or, at the
controller’s discretion, new crossing restrictions could
be given. At BAMBE, the status of aircraft transitioned
back to that of an IFR aircraft.

Intent Information: Free maneuvering responsibilities
could not be met using today’s flight deck resources.
Specifically, conflict detection and resolution (CD&R)
capabilities are required. In order to predict the “when”
and “where” of conflicts, it is necessary to predict the
flight paths of the surrounding aircraft, and this, in turn,
requires information about the future flight path. There
are two general approaches to this problem. One
approach bases conflict predictions on the broadcast of
aircraft state information (current position and 3-D
velocity), or state information plus Mode Control Panel
(MCP) commanded intent (in this case, the location at
which an aircraft automatically levels off during a climb
or descent also is broadcast). In other words, this first
approach bases predictions solely on current-state
variables. However, in order to insure detection of
conflicts prior to a minimum time to LOS, this approach
also requires restricting an aircraft from changing its
flight path (i.e., state) until the pilot assures that it will
not create a near-term conflict with other aircraft. If a
pilot was trying to follow a flight plan using this
approach, it would require the flight crew to monitor
and ensure the safety of maneuvers at every trajectory
change point. This could substantially increase the
mental workload of the flight crew. The second general
approach is to share intent information based on flight
plans (e.g., broadcasting state plus future trajectory
change points in the flight plan). Recently, the broadcast
of partial flight plan information, in the form of the next
four trajectory change points, has been embraced by the
RTCA (2002). However, if flight intent information is
represented by a finite number of trajectory change
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(see Canton, Refai, Johnson, & Battiste, 2005, for a
fuller discussion of the CD&R implementation). In
addition, the CSD also incorporated a tool for the
management of RTAs that allowed the pilot to enter,
execute, and monitor RTA conformance, all from the
CSD. This display is described more fully by Granada,
Dao, Wong, Johnson, and Battiste (2005), and in a users
manual that can be found
at: http://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/ihh/cdti/download.html.

Figure 1. 3D CSD. To view pictures in color or to
download a demo (http://human-factors.arc. nasa.
gov/ihh/cdti/ download.html).
points (e.g., as in the four points suggested by the
RTCA), the time and area represented by the
information could vary greatly (from representing a
great amount of time/airspace to representing very little
amount of time/airspace). Thus new conflicts could
appear with little warning. Therefore, a different
approach was utilized in the development of the AMES
Display. Specifically, the AMES Display uses
information regarding the entire flight plan. By
incorporating the entire flight plan, the information
presented on the AMES Display ensures (at the design
level) that the flight crew has an adequate look-ahead
time and eliminates abbreviated flight plans as the cause
of alerts that “pop-up” with insufficient time to resolve.
Flight Deck Tools: The tools that supported CD&R,
along with pilot situation awareness, were all integrated
into a PC-based Cockpit Situation Display (CSD) shown
in Figure 1. This display was built on the AMES Display
and should be considered an extension of that display.
Many of these tools were also integrated into an aircraft
simulator based on the Multi-Aircraft Simulator (MACS)
developed by the NASA Ames Airspace Operations
Laboratory (Raytheon ATMSDI Team, 2004).
The CSD was a 3D perspective display that allowed the
pilot to display the 4D flight plans of traffic, see traffic
conflicts, and manipulate the viewing angle. Graphical
path replanning capabilities of the 3D CSD were
integrated with the Flight Management System (FMS),
such that a pilot could graphically design a conflict-free
3D route, then load and execute it from the CSD
interface. Thus all conflict resolutions and replanned
flight paths depended on these human-centered tools

The MACS simulator emulated a Boeing 757, and
included an FMS emulation. The pilot was able to use the
FMS in the standard fashion to design new routes, but
these would show up on the CSD and be tested for
conflicts. If the CSD showed them to be conflict free, the
pilot could then execute these routes from the FMS. In
addition to the FMS capabilities, the pilots could take their
aircraft off of the flight plan and onto a 3D vector using the
MCP. Again, the vector would be probed for conflicts,
with the pilot executing the vector only if there was at least
four minutes of clear path ahead of the aircraft. Finally, the
system allowed the pilots to use the FMS to recapture their
flight plan by using the FMS to take them directly to any
subsequent waypoint in their flight plan.
Method
Experimental Design
The experimental design was a comparison of four
conditions (Figure 2). These conditions compared four
levels of AFR/IFR Scalability/Mixture in the en route
ZFW Center airspace. “T0” represents a traffic threshold
that approximates the current-day monitor alert
parameter for the simulated airspace. “T1” is a projected
threshold above which managed-only operations cannot
be achieved. T0 and T1 levels were determined in a
prior controller-in-the-loop study at NASA Ames. “C1”
represents a high IFR traffic volume that can be handled
using normal ATC operations. “C2” is the same traffic
volume but with 25% of the aircraft AFR, and 75% IFR.
“C3” maintained the same number of IFR aircraft as in
“C2”, but added AFR aircraft to increase the total traffic
by an average of 60%, while in “C4” this increase was
approximately 100%. While these factors changed the
density and mix of traffic in the en route airspace, the
rate/mix of arrivals into DFW remained constant, with
20%-25% of them being AFR in conditions C2-C4.
This design allows two critical comparisons. First, by
comparing C1 and C2 we can determine if introducing
mixed operations alone enhances or degrades performance
and workload/acceptability. Second, comparisons of C2C4 test scalability. That is, can AFR aircraft be used to
increase traffic load by approximately 50% and 100%
without significantly degrading overall operations?
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Figure 2. En Route Traffic Load and Mix by Condition
Participants
Ten current or retired airline pilots flew nine Ames
experimental aircraft in the simulations. Eight flew
desktop single-aircraft MACS flight deck stations, and
two served as captain and first officer in the Advanced
Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS), a high fidelity
reconfigurable simulator with full window visuals. The
total number of flight hours for these pilots ranged from
4,500 to 22,000, with a mean of approximately 11,000
hours. All the Ames pilots had glass cockpit experience
ranging from 85 to 8,000 hours, with a group mean of
approximately 4,000 total hours. All participants had
previous experience with the DAG-TM project, having
participated in several previous studies.
Procedure
The simulation was conducted over eight days. The first
two days were used for orientation and final training.
Initial pilot training had taken place during two previous
dry run and dress rehearsal simulations. Four simulation
scenarios per day were conducted on days 3-7, with day
seven reserved to replace scenarios if there were
unanticipated problems (there were none). The eighth
day was used for extensive debriefing. On each of the
days 3-6, all of the four conditions (C1-C4) were
presented. Across these days, all eight single station
pilots flew two arrivals and two overflights for each of
the four conditions. The two pilots in the ACFS
Simulator always flew arrivals. For half of the scenarios,
the Ames aircraft began in the ZFW Ardmore airspace,
while on the other half they began in the ZFW Amarillo
High/Wichita Falls High airspace.

The overflights had no special requirements other than
to maintain separation from other aircraft. All of the
arrivals began between 160 NM and 200 NM from the
BAMBE arrival meter fix. As the arrivals approached
160NM from BAMBE, they were given RTAs by ATC.
These RTAs were designed to require a substantial
delay relative to the aircraft’s present estimated time of
arrival (ETA) at BAMBE. This delay was large enough
that the pilots could not accommodate it through a speed
change alone, but required the pilots to modify their
flight plans by “stretching” them using their path
replanning tools. The arrival aircraft were at various en
route altitudes above FL300, and reached their top of
descent approximately 80 NM from BAMBE. Data
collection ceased for an aircraft when the aircraft
reached the BAMBE meter fix (at 11000 ft).
Results and Discussion
Single Pilot AFR Meter Fix Conformance: There was
no significant difference in objectively measured
performance as a function of any of the conditions.
Therefore, from the Ames flight deck perspective,
neither mixed operations, nor increased en route traffic
load had any effect on the ability of the arriving flights
to meet the meter fix constraints. Among the AFR
flights, one failed to meet the speed constraint, and one
failed to meet the altitude constraint, but all met the
RTA constraint.
Single Pilot AFR Self-Separation Performance: There
were no LOS incidents for the Ames AFR aircraft.
There were 139 conflicts resolved. Of these, 122 were
detected prior to four minutes to conflict. The concept
requires that AFR aircraft detect conflicts at least four
minutes prior to the expected LOS, that no aircraft
maneuver such that they create conflicts with expected
losses of separation under four minutes, and that the
AFR aircraft resolve conflicts prior to two minutes to
LOS. Figure 3 shows 17 late alerts (less than four
minutes to LOS). Consistent with the increased traffic
load, the majority (11 late conflicts) occurred in the C4
condition. All 17 were due to an aircraft executing a
maneuver which brought about the late alert. However,
a maneuver by an Ames single piloted AFR aircraft was
responsible for these late conflicts (concept violations)
in only four instances. Furthermore, in three of the four
cases, this was due to a flaw in the conflict resolution
software (indicating to the pilot that the maneuver was
conflict free, when it was not). The reason for the
remaining apparent procedural error remains to
be determined.
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Figure 3. Number of conflicts detected 2-4 minutes
to LOS, and beyond 4 minutes to LOS
Figure 4 shows a total of four conflicts with late
resolutions (under two minutes to LOS), with three of
them due to a software flaw in which the conflict
detection did not function properly. The fourth instance
was associated with the aforementioned incident where
the pilot maneuvered into a conflict at some point
between two and four minutes to LOS, with the
result being that the pilot was not able to resolve the
conflict until there was less than two minutes until the
projected LOS.
Figure 5 shows the amount of time needed to resolve
conflicts. While not an integral part of the concept, the
Ames AFR pilots were asked to resolve all conflicts
within two minutes (120 sec) of receiving a conflict
alert. Figure 5 shows that this criterion was met
approximately 80% of the time.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the number of times Ownship
and Intruder resolved the conflict as a function of
burdening. While the IFR aircraft almost never resolved
a conflict (it was never burdened), it is noteworthy that

Figure 5. Distribution of times required to resolve
conflict alerts
almost 1/3 of the non-burdened aircraft resolved the
conflicts in AFR-AFR conflicts.
Subjective Assessments: The subjective assessment of
pilot workload was measured following each run using
the Modified Cooper Harper (MCH) workload scale.
The MCH allows for ratings between 1 (Very
easy/workload insignificant) and 10 (Impossible/task
abandoned, unable to apply sufficient effort). Pilot
responses across all simulation trials ranged from 1 to 6.
However, approximately 98 percent of responses ranged
from 1 to 3. In order to receive a rating between 1 and 3,
it must be possible to complete the task, and workload
must be perceived as tolerable and satisfactory. Ratings
from 4 to 6 suggest that task workload is high but not
high enough to impact performance on the primary task.
Figure 7 shows the average workload ratings of arrivals
and overflights in each condition (±1 SD). Not
surprisingly, workload ratings were higher for the
arrival flights than for overflights in all conditions.
Pilots also responded unanimously with the lowest
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That said, the excellent performance of the pilots, along
with the low workload, suggests that the design of the
tools and procedures was very successful, both in terms
of software design and human factors design. The high
ratings given to situation awareness and ease in meeting
RTA also bear this out. That this was achieved while
intimately involving the pilot in the resolutions of
conflicts, and in other critical decision-making, shows
the viability of a human-centered approach to free flight.
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References

Figure 7. MCH workload ratings as a function of
flight phase and condition
possible workload rating (1) for the managed overflight
runs (C1). In addition, Figure 7 shows an increase in
perceived workload from all managed (C1) to mixed
(C2-C4) operations for both flight types, but workload
remained acceptably low.
Nine of the ten pilots completed post-simulation
questionnaires that elicited their opinion of the viability
of the DAG-TM Free Flight concept and of the
implementation. Figure 8 shows that the majority
preferred AFR (Free Flight) for Safety, Workload, Ease
of Meeting RTA, and Situation Awareness.
Conclusions
The results support the viability of the En Route Free
Maneuvering concept. Not only were the concept
requirements met, but the subjective data show that the
implementation resulted in low workload, and a high
degree of pilot acceptance. While these results must be
considered as very preliminary, especially given the near
perfect nature of the information exchanged between
aircraft. Also, the lack of disruptive events (e.g., weather
and emergencies) also limits the generality of the study.
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